Strategy

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Why Talent is Limiting Supply in the Smartphone OS Market

Tuesday, August 17th, 2010

How many smartphone mobile operating systems can the market support? Wrong question. In a market of billions of potential devices with limited network effects [1] and hyper-growth demand the market could support lots of smartphone mobile operating systems – where lots is defined as greater than six and less than twenty. The limiting factor is not demand but rather supply. How many companies can build a competitive mobile OS? The fire sale of Palm and the launch of Blackberry Torch makes it clear that the list of companies that have the skills and resources to build, launch, and sustain a competitive mobile OS is getting smaller each month. Watching this playout feels like watching the top riders in the Tour de France fight their way to the top of Col du Tourmalet — each and every year only the most talented riders keep pace as the ride becomes absolutely grueling.

Companies are starting to fall by the wayside as the stacked teams of Apple, Google, and soon Microsoft take firm control of the race.
Lets look at a checklist of capabilities one needs to launch a competitive mobile OS. Half way down this list you will realize that very few companies have assembled a deep and wide enough talent pool to execute a smartphone mobile os on a global scale.

What you need What it gets you
User Experience
Multi-touch interface Parity
Visual appeal Potential differentiation
Multi-tasking Parity
Apps
Games, Games, and Games (1) Acquisition (great games sell devices)
(2) Lock-In (spend creates switching costs)
20,000 Quality Apps Parity
Discovery & Merchandising Easy & trust worthy
Media
Music Lock-In (spend creates switching costs)
Movie rentals Engagement
TV show rentals Engagement
Browser
HTML5 + CSS3 Compliant Browser Parity
Information Finding
Search Utility
Carrier financial incentive via revenue share
Voice Search Cool demo
Maps (limited number of suppliers) Utility + parity
Navigation (limited number of suppliers) Utility + parity
Communication Cloud
Mail Utility + parity
Voice Transcription Diffentriated
PIM Services Utility + parity
Payments
One Click Buy (micro transactions) Parity + Frictionless commerce
Global (90+ markets) Utility + parity
Fraud Mgmt Utility + parity
Launch Marketing
$250M consumer marketing Consumer awareness.
Percieved momentum for developers
$50M App developer launch Studio compensation to seed app library and app competitions
Devices & Distribution
#1 and/or #2 Carrier in top 20 markets (first yr) Market coverage
3 to 4 OEM’s building 8 million devices (first yr) Consumer choice of mid to high-end devices
Developers, Developers, Developers!
Popular IDE App quality
Time to market
Developer happiness
Deep SDK Device access (e.g. camera, acceleramator)
UI (e.g. animation, controls)
Service access (e.g. maps, contacts, mails)
Enterprise
Security Parity
Employee device & app provisioning Parity

[1] Limited Network Effects: During the PC war application developers propelled Windows PC to its monopoly position – users adopted the OS with the widest range of applications and developers adopted the platform with the most users. In the mobile smartphone OS war the top 20,000 apps that matter will be replicated to the top five mobile os platforms in each market or region muting the possible network effects because the development costs are relatively low.

Myth of the Month: Microsoft Windows Phone 7 is Too Late.

Sunday, August 8th, 2010

Only two short years ago many thought Apple had built an insurmountable lead.  Android’s recent surge is proving that entirely wrong. Today, many believe that Microsoft is too late to the game.   This too is entirely wrong.  A lead of sixty million devices is not much of a lead in the mobile phone market.  To put this in perspective:

  • 140 million DVD units per year [source]
  • 360 million PCs (laptops, netbooks, tablets) units per year [source]
  • 100 million videogame consoles units per year [source]
  • 1.3 billion mobile phone units per year [source]

Mobile phones sell more than all of those – combined.  The two largest handset manufacturers Nokia and Samsung shipped 175M mobile phones (mostly feature phones) in Q1 of 2010.  That is more than 3x the total global PC shipments for Q1 2010.

The smartphone market of today is not what Google, Apple, Microsoft, HP, and Nokia are fighting for.   Today’s smartphone market is measured in tens of millions of devices per quarter across all the major players and by 2011 there will be 449M smartphone users (i.e. active subscribers).  The smartphone market of three to four years will be measured in hundreds of millions of smartphone devices per quarter.

Let’s be clear why Microsoft is not too late to this game:

  • Massive market.  An early lead of 60M devices in a 1.3B/yr shipped devices is not much a of a lead.
  • Device churn: People churn through phones rapidly (PC turnover is ~4 yrs and phones is ~18 months)
  • Weak lock-In:  Users are not spending hundreds or thousands of dollars on content (music, apps).
  • Weak network effects:  Given low cost of developing apps, the important ones are being replicated to the top tier platforms.
  • Carriers want Microsoft: They don’t want a Google and Android dominated market.  They want at least four major platforms each with 25% of the market, and believe Microsoft has the patience (i.e. warchest) and persistence to be one of them.

Full Disclosure:  I don’t work at Microsoft and I don’t own any Microsoft shares.  I simply believe the Android vs. iPhone conversation is myopic and ignores how insignificant of a lead both of them have established.

Practicing Focus the Apple Way

Tuesday, July 27th, 2010

Today, Apple launched a whole slew of new and upgraded products today, here are the highlights:

  • New Magic trackpad  – this  is very cool as it brings full multi-touch to the desktop (review here)
  • 27 Inch LED Display (review here)
  • Upgrades to iMac line (review here)

A pretty significant product launch.  So, you would think with Apple passing on a big Steve Jobs press event at the very least they would swap the Apple.com homepage to promote the new products.  Not a chance.  They are laser focused on the iPhone.

How Enterprise Software Companies are Getting “Blue Starred”

Saturday, July 24th, 2010

In the movie Wall Street Gordon Gekko attempt s to buy-out and liquidate Blue Star Airlines in order to extract $75M from their over-funded pension.   Gordon Gekko sings the turn-around tune to  union leaders yet his true intentions to liquidate become apparent to all and the showdown between Gordon and his naïve protégé Bud Fox (his father is a union leader at Blue Star) begins.  After having dinner with an old friend from the enterprise software world I realized a form of liquidation is now hitting the enterprise software business.  These companies are getting “Blue Starred.”   Buyout firms are extracting value from enterprise software leaving business users with systems that barely work.

First, lets begin with some context on the enterprise software business.  During the golden years (nineties) of enterprise software – companies like Siebel, Peoplesoft, ePhipany and many more brought software from the back-office (order processing and billing) into the hands of sales reps, customer service, marketing, and human resources (commonly referred to as the front-office).  The license based enterprise software revenue model works like this.  They sell $1M worth of software licenses and then charge companies annual maintenance fees (approximately 20% of the original license cost) for patches and incremental versions of the software.   So, a $1M license software deal actually translated into $2M over five years ($200K annual maintenance fees times five years plus the original license deal of $1M.)   Once a customer installs the software they are effectively locked in for many years.  These maintenance revenue streams are highly profitable as they not paying sales commissions and support costs are spread across thousands of customers.

With that context, it’s pretty clear what buyout firms are doing.  Acquire an enterprise software company with a significant customer base, cut new product development, move support to a low-cost labor market, and milk the maintenance revenue stream.

Yes, this is part of the natural product lifecycle – these are companies on their death-bed.   But the unfortunate part of this is that users (customer service agents, payroll admin, and hiring managers) are stuck with barely usable (try using Oracle Applications) and now largely unsupported tools.

Given the improvements in user experience (Apple) and collaboration tools (Facebook, LinkedIn, etc.) over the past five years these older software tools are a massive productivity drain for millions of users.  There needs to be a better and faster way to flush out mostly defunct enterprise systems and migrate users quickly to something usable.  There is hope, companies like Yammer cleverly bypasses traditional IT purchasers and first hooks the people that matter most — the users.

Three Ways for Groupon to Start Building Defensibility

Wednesday, July 14th, 2010

Riding Groupon’s recent success competitors are popping up practically daily  (see the competitor list here).  In the early days of commerce Amazon faced well funded competition from the likes of Pets.com, Buy.com, Furniture.com, and thousands of others.  Many of these are not around anymore and others are simply shells of of their former selves.  Amazon built up its defensives with broad product coverage  (tons of categories and the marketplace) and innovating in features and services like product reviews (hard to replicate) and Amazon Prime (customer lock-in).   So, what will Groupon do to quickly start establishing its defensibility?  Here are three ideas:

  1. Multiple Parallel Deals:  This is another way of saying broad offer selection. With only a deal or two a day per city (~50 or so cities) the activation energy a competitor needs to catch up is fairly small (sales force and some search marketing spend).  If they had more liquidity on the supply side (hundreds of deals per day per city) it would be very hard to create this kind of supply with a sales force.  To do this effectively they need to build a recommendation engine that ensures that I never see a deal for a pedicure.
  2. Turn Competitors into Sales Franchises: Local businesses don’t have the time or desire to transact with multiple group buying sites. Furthermore, Groupon’s competitor’s are starting to plateau, as this happens will seek new ways to generate incremental revenues.  Groupon can avoid a bloody fight with these competitors by turning them into a local sales franchise.  They bring deals to Groupon and in return get a cut of any deals sold. Of course, these local sales franchises have to use all the listings and contract management systems Groupon provides.
  3. Build Local Business Reviews:   For each deal many hundreds of people experience the service.  If 10% of these wrote a detailed review they could quickly become an excellent source of business reviews.  Today’s Groupon in San Jose is running a deal for Cindy’s Yoga (see here) that 792 people purchased.  If ten percent of purchasers wrote a review (or 79 reviews) Groupon would have 36 more reviews than Yelp’s listing for Cindy’s Yoga (see here).

Pricing Product Complements

Friday, June 25th, 2010

37Signals recently launched an iPad app called Draft. Draft is a simple sketching application with built-in integration to Campfire, another 37Signals product. Now for the controversial part: Draft costs $9.99 while Adobe offers a similar app for free. This pricing strategy is a mistake.

Their objective centers around maximizing profit from the complementary product (Draft) rather than the core subscription product, Campfire. This is akin to Bloomberg trying to charge a hefty premium for content — Bloomberg news content is a complementary product to their lucrative subscription Bloomberg Terminal business.

The objective should be to get every Campfire user with an iPad to purchase the Draft app.  Price it low enough to make it a no-brainer decision for these users.  If every Campfire user (with an iPad) purchased the Draft iPad app Campfire would become far more valuable. Campfire users would post more content via Draft and more conversations around the content creates deeper customer lock-in.  As Campfire becomes more valuable customer are less likely to cancel their subscription.  37Signals knows better then anybody else that losing a subscription revenue generating customer is very hard to replace.

Given the amount of controversy this $10 price point is generating the last thing 37Signals needs is Campfire users thinking twice about purchasing the app — at $4 or $5 these types of users don’t think twice.

[See here for an excellent essay on product complements by Joel Spolsky)